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Abstract: The success of any perimeter intrusion detection system depends on three important 
performance parameters: the probability of detection (POD), the nuisance alarm rate (NAR), and the 
false alarm rate (FAR). The most fundamental parameter, POD, is normally related to a number of 
factors such as the event of interest, the sensitivity of the sensor, the installation quality of the system, 
and the reliability of the sensing equipment. The suppression of nuisance alarms without degrading 
sensitivity in fiber optic intrusion detection systems is key to maintaining acceptable performance. 
Signal processing algorithms that maintain the POD and eliminate nuisance alarms are crucial for 
achieving this. In this paper, a robust event classification system using supervised neural networks 
together with a level crossings (LCs) based feature extraction algorithm is presented for the detection 
and recognition of intrusion and non-intrusion events in a fence-based fiber-optic intrusion detection 
system. A level crossings algorithm is also used with a dynamic threshold to suppress torrential 
rain-induced nuisance alarms in a fence system. Results show that rain-induced nuisance alarms can 
be suppressed for rainfall rates in excess of 100 mm/hr with the simultaneous detection of intrusion 
events. The use of a level crossing based detection and novel classification algorithm is also 
presented for a buried pipeline fiber optic intrusion detection system for the suppression of nuisance 
events and discrimination of intrusion events. The sensor employed for both types of systems is a 
distributed bidirectional fiber-optic Mach-Zehnder (MZ) interferometer. 
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1. Introduction 
Distributed fiber-optic sensors have been used in 
many commercial and defense applications. These 
sensors have been used to protect assets such as 
airports, commercial and defense infrastructure, and 
oil and pipeline systems. A number of underlying 
sensing technologies can be implemented when 
designing distributed fiber-optic sensors which 
include Mach-Zehnder (MZ) interferometers [1, 2], 
Michelson interferometers [1], Fiber-Bragg grating 
arrays [1], Sagnac loops [1], and coherent optical 
time domain reflectometry (C-OTDR) [3, 4]. 
High performance distributed fiber-optic sensors 
have been applied to both outdoor and buried 
intrusion detection systems in recent years. The 
advantages of using fiber optic sensors in intrusion 
detection systems over conventional technologies 
are well recognized and include their immunity to 
electromagnetic interference, high sensitivity, no 
power required in the field, intrinsic safety in 
volatile environments, and high reliability and cost 
effectiveness over large distances. Their 
implementation in noisy or hostile environments 
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presents some interesting challenges which need to 
be overcome in order to achieve acceptable 
performance. In all outdoor perimeter intrusion 
detection systems, there exists a performance 
trade-off between the probability of detection and 
nuisance alarm rate [5]. These systems are 
susceptible to a wide range of nuisance alarms from 
both environmental and man-made sources which 
can include wind, torrential rain, storms, and nearby 
traffic crossings. 
A number of sensor related signal processing 
algorithms have been presented in the literature for 
suppressing nuisance alarms. Jiang et al. [6] 
proposed a classification method for an MZ 
interferometric sensor using a wavelet packet 
transform for denoising and feature extraction and a 
neural network as a classifier. This method however 
is not suitable for eliminating nuisance alarms due to 
torrential rain as the signal amplitude of the sensor 
would be saturated in the time domain. Vries [7] 
proposed an acoustic based perimeter intrusion 
classification system that deployed a neural network 
with frequency domain features to detect different 
types of intrusion events such as climbing, cutting 
and jumping over the fence. The system however 
suffered from performance degradation when the 
quality of the sound (SNR) generated by the 
intruders and the surrounding environment 
decreased. Moreover, the frequency domain features 
were not robust enough to distinguish between 
nuisance and intrusion events. 
Yousefi et al. [8] presented a fence breach 
detection system which could detect activity on the 
fence and discriminate different types of activity. 
The hardware of the system comprised a 3-axis 
accelerometer and a RISC microprocessor. The 
system employed an algorithm that detects activity 
and non-activity on the fence. It also recognized the 
type of breach whether it was due to rattling caused 
by strong wind or a person climbing on the fence. 
This system used signal variation features along 
with the energy of two bandpass filters to separate 
the rattle and climb frequency components. While 
this showed some success, it was not possible to 
discriminate between classes that had a similar 
impact on a fence. Moreover, this algorithm was 
used to classify a small number of classes (limited to 
two classes). Min et al. [9] proposed a real-time 
monitoring system using an audio sensor to detect 
abnormal activity in the vicinity of buried gas pipes. 
They extracted a frequency domain feature using a 
nonlinear scale filter bank method and cepstral mean 
subtraction along with a combination of two 
classifiers using the Gaussian mixture model and 
multi-layer perceptron. Their system achieved a 
92% detection rate to abnormal activity such as 
hammer drilling and digging. The detection rate of 
intrusion was however degraded in the presence of 
background noise such as traffic in the vicinity of 
the sensor. 
In this paper, robust level crossings based signal 
processing algorithms are presented for detecting 
intrusion event and suppressing nuisance alarms in 
both outdoor fence-mounted and buried fiber-optic 
intrusion detection systems without significantly 
affecting sensitivity. The use of a real-time level 
crossing algorithm to suppress rain-induced 
nuisance alarms and discriminate between 
continuous nuisance and non-continuous intrusion 
events in perimeter intrusion detection systems is 
described. The use of a level crossing based 
detection method and novel classification algorithm 
is also presented for the suppression and 
discrimination of nuisance events from intrusion 
events in a buried intrusion detection system. 
Results are shown from real-time fiber optic sensing 
systems. 
2. Fiber optic intrusion detection system 
The intrusion detection system used in this work 
is based on the future fiber technologies microstrain 
locator technology as applied to fence perimeter 
applications [2]. The microstrain locator is based on 
the use of a bidirectional MZ as a distributed sensor 
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to detect and locate an intrusion anywhere along the 
sensing length, LS, as shown in Fig. 1. The two 
sensing fibers and the lead out fiber are typically 
housed in a standard single mode fiber optic cable 
which is mounted on the perimeter fence. In this 
paper, the intrusion detection system will be referred 
to as the locator. 
 
Fig. 1 A basic future fiber technologies microstrain locator 
system using a bi-directional MZ with the input polarization 
control: C1 – C5 are all 50:50 fiber couplers. 
The deployed sensing system consists of an 
industrial computer which houses a highly coherent 
1550-nm laser source which injects continuous wave 
counter-propagating light into the MZ. Two 
detectors, also housed in the sensing controller, 
receive the clockwise (CW) and counter-clockwise 
(CCW) signals from the MZ to analyze the signals. 
The sensing controller also includes polarization 
controllers PCCW and PCCCW to maximize the fringe 
visibility of the MZ and optimize the location 
accuracy by actively compensating for changes in 
fiber birefringence. Detection of an event is based 
on analyzing the interferometric signals, while the 
location of an event along the sensing length LS is 
resolved by measuring the time difference between 
received counter propagating signals. Additionally, 
using the event signals detected by both detectors it 
is possible to apply the appropriate signal processing 
techniques to classify the signals and perform both 
event recognition and event discrimination. 
2.1 System installation 
For fence-mounted perimeter systems, the 
implementation of the sensor as a fence-based 
perimeter system is achieved by housing the two 
sensing fibers as well as the insensitive lead-out 
fiber Llead-out in a single fiber cable which is directly 
attached to the fence fabric as shown in Figs. 2 and 
3 [10]. This can be applied to a range of fence 
fabrics including chain link, weld mesh, and 
palisade styles. 
 Inactive 
lead-in cable Start sensor
Fibre optic 
sensing cable End sensor
Microstrain/locator 




Fig. 2 Use of a single fiber cable to implement the 
bidirectional MZ sensing system. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Implementation of the locator sensor on a fence 
perimeter. 
The quality of installation of the sensing cable 
on the fence structure is very important in achieving 
optimum system performance and is very often 
underestimated. The fence construction needs to be 
built according to an acceptable standard and the 
sensing cable attached correctly. Poor fence 
construction and sensor cable attachment contribute 
to excessive nuisance alarms and long-term 
performance degradation. While good installation 
practices do not eliminate all nuisance alarms, it will 
ensure that excessive nuisance signals are not 
generated due to hypersensitivity of the fence to 
environmental noise. It also enables optimal 
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performance of any nuisance mitigation algorithms 
employed. Another factor which impacts the 
probability of detection is the cable configuration 
which is used. Figures 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c) show 
three different examples of possible installation 
configurations of the sensor cable on a chain link 
fence. While the configuration in Fig. 4(a) can 
provide a basic level of security, looping the sensor 
up and down the posts [Fig. 4(b)] will improve the 
detection rate of fence climbing at or near the more 
rigid posts and is a typical configuration used. 
Where higher sensitivity is required, other cable 
configurations may be implemented such as an extra 
loop in the middle of the fence panels [Fig. 4(c)]. 
The exact configuration used will vary and will 
depend on the level of security required, the types of 
intrusion events to be detected, and the skill level of 
the intruder. It is important that the type of the fence 
barrier and cable configuration is chosen to match 
the security requirements of the proposed system. 
 
Fig. 4 Example of different cable configurations on a chain 
link fence. 
In buried systems, the sensor cable is configured 
identical to the fence sensor except the sensing cable 
is typically buried next to an oil or gas pipeline to 
detect third party interference (TPI) activities as 
shown in Fig. 5. Inevitably, it will also be sensitive 
to other non-intrusion events such as those from 
nearby traffic and railway crossings. 
 
Fig. 5 Cross section of a buried fiber optic intrusion 
detection system for detection of third party interference. 
2.2 Performance parameters 
The success of any perimeter intrusion detection 
system depends on three important performance 
parameters: the probability of detection (POD), the 
nuisance alarm rate (NAR), and the false alarm rate 
(FAR). The POD is related to the sensitivity of the 
system and provides an indication of a system’s 
ability to detect an intrusion within the protected 
area. A nuisance alarm is any alarm which is 
generated by an event that is not of interest. A false 
alarm refers to an alarm generated by the system 
electronics and is not related to the sensor or an 
event. False alarms can be minimized through the 
appropriate system design. Nuisance alarms are 
typically generated by environmental conditions 
such as rain, wind, snow, wildlife, and vegetation, as 
well as man-made sources such as traffic crossings, 
industrial noises, and other ambient noise sources. 
While increasing the sensitivity of a system 
increases its POD, it also increases its sensitivity to 
nuisance events. Basic event detection algorithms 
with little event discrimination capability which are 
applied to a wide range of intrusion events can lead 
to increased nuisance alarm rates as well as 
decreased POD. Advanced signal processing 
algorithms that can maintain a high POD and 
eliminate nuisance alarms are therefore crucial in 
perimeter intrusion detection systems. In the 
following sections, the use of event recognition and 
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classification techniques to maintain a high POD 
and minimize alarms caused by nuisance events will 
be presented for each type of the system. 
3. Intrusion detection and nuisance 
suppression in fence systems 
Event classification in perimeter intrusion 
detection systems can be defined as the 
categorization of detected signals into identifiable 
pattern classes through the extraction and analysis of 
unique signal features and attributes. The selection 
of unique features from the detected signals is 
paramount as it ultimately leads to a simplification 
of the classification problem as well as faster 
processing and higher detection rates [11]. The main 
benefits of an accurate and robust event 
classification system include the ability to 
discriminate between nuisance events and intrusion 
events, and more importantly, to suppress nuisance 
alarms without significantly compromising the 
probability of detection. 
A typical event classification system consists of 
a pre-processing stage that extracts unique features 
from the detected event, and a classifier that assigns 
the computed features to a particular class of 
intrusion or nuisance (see Fig. 6). Feature samples of 
nuisance and intrusion events are used to train a 
classifier offline, and when training is complete, the 
system will classify new instances based on what is 
learnt in the training phase. Accurate nuisance and 
intrusion event classification requires both features 
that are highly discriminative with respect to the 
classes of interest and a classifier which can form 



















Classification result  
Fig. 6 An event classification system consisting of a 
pre-processing stage and a real-time classification stage. 
3.1 Neural networks based classification 
Accurate event detection and the use of suitably 
discriminative features are critical in any event 
classification application. When training a classifier, 
the classifier creates boundaries in the features space 
between the investigated classes. Inaccurate 
detection of an event can be a common cause of 
errors in automatic classification [12]. 
A real-time event detection and feature 
extraction based on a level crossings (LC) algorithm 
was proposed and implemented [10]. This algorithm 
has been used to form the basis of detecting and 
classifying both intrusion and non-intrusion 
(nuisance) events. This allows for an effective way 
of reducing the nuisance alarm rate without reducing 
the sensitivity of the system. In this work, the 
intrusion events of interest for fence perimeter 
systems are fence-climbing and fence-cutting, while 
the nuisance events which need to be recognized and 
discriminated are throwing a stone at the fence 
(stone-throwing) and dragging a stick along the 
fence (stick-dragging). 
In general, the LC algorithm can be defined by 
the number of crossings, in the positive direction, of 
an input vector through a given threshold and can be 
expressed as [10, 13] 
    1
0
( ) & ( 1)
N
n
LC x n thresh x n thresh

   ≥  (1) 
where x is a signal of the length N, the parameter 
“thresh” is the level threshold, and the indicator 
function Ψ  is 1 if its argument is true, or 0 
otherwise. The level threshold is always positive and 
just above the system noise. 
Based on the level crossings representation of 
the intrusion signal, a number of configurable 
parameters can be defined to detect events in real 
time [10]: 
1. Trigger level (TL): the level at which the 
intrusion event will be detected. 
2. Zero settle blocks (ZSB): the number of 
blocks with zero values before and after an event to 
determine the start and end of the event. 
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3. Zero level (ZL): the level crossing per block 
below which will be considered as zero. 
4. Maximum duration (MD) of the event: limits 
the duration of a continuous event such as stick 
dragging on the fence. 
Figures 7(a), 7(b), and 8 show examples of a 
climb event, cut event and stick drag event detected 
by the proposed detection algorithm, respectively. 
The TL parameter was set to 5 LCs, the MD was set 
to 46 blocks, and the ZSB was set to 5 blocks. 
Figure 8 shows the termination of the long event 
after it satisfies the MD parameter. Features are 
extracted from these detected events and fed into 
neural networks. 
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(b) 
Fig. 7 Time domain and LC representation of (a) a climb 
event and (b) cut event detected by the proposed algorithm. 
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Fig. 8 Time domain and LC representation of a stick drag 
event detected by the proposed algorithm. 
A time-domain signal contains too much 
irrelevant data to be used directly for classification 
[11]. Additional features are usually required for an 
effective classification. Using the LC algorithm, five 
features have been extracted from the LC 
representation of the detected intrusion signals. 
These features are: 
1. Total level crossings (TLC): the total number 
of level crossings for the duration of the event. 
2. Duration (d): the duration of the detected 
event as a number of blocks (see Fig. 9). 
3. Slope of the falling edge of the LCs: the slope 
of the falling edge of the LC graph as measured 
between the line formed when joining the end point 
of the duration (x1, y1) and the point (x2, y2). In Fig. 9 
which represents a climbing event, a threshold has 
been used to select the point (x2, y2). 
4. The angle (slope) of the rising edge of the LCs, 
 : the angle of the rising slope edge,  , is 
measured between the line formed when joining the 
initial point of the duration and the maximum point 
on the LCs graph, and the x-axis (see Fig. 9). In 
most of the cutting events, the rising edge of the LCs 
forms approximately a right angle (90°) with the 
x-axis, while the climbing events form an acute 
angle (< 90°). This feature is very important for the 
climbing event and cut event classification. 
5. Number of zeros (NZ): the number of zeros 
(NZ) is the number of blocks within the detected 
events which have a value less than the ZL parameter. 
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Fig. 9 Representation of the extracted features from the LCs 
graph of a climbing event. 
A three-layer supervised artificial neural network 
(ANN) with a back-propagation learning algorithm 
was used to classify the detected events. The five 
extracted LC based features were used as inputs to 
the ANN. The advantage of using an ANN is that it 
can be trained and can implement fast decision 
algorithms making them suitable for real-time 
applications [14, 15]. Additionally, event 
classification by the ANN does not require any 
statistical assumptions regarding the data and can 
learn to recognize the characteristic features of the 
data to classify the event efficiently and accurately. 
The LCs and neural network based classification 
system described was implemented in a chain link 
fence-mounted fiber-optic intrusion detection system 
based on the locator technology with a sensing 
length of 600 m. The extracted LC based features 
were normalized and used as inputs to the 
feed-forward neural networks with an input layer 
consisting of 5 neurons, a hidden layer with 3 
neurons, and an output layer consisting of 2 neurons. 
Performance of the classification system was 
measured against fence-climb, fence-cut, stick 
dragging, and stone-throwing classes. The ANN was 
trained with training data representing these classes, 
and the weights were stored for real-time testing. 
Fifteen training events were used per class. 
The total number of tested events for each class 
was 26. Table 1 shows the impact of the proposed 
features on the performance of the classification 
system. From the table, it can be observed that while 
using four of the extracted LC features produces an 
optimum result for fence cutting and stone throwing 
events, by using all five features, it is possible to 
achieve a 100% correct classification rate for all 
four events. The classification accuracy of the 
system is given by 
classification accuracy 100 %t
n
       (2) 
where t is the number of events correctly classified, 
and n is the total number of tested events per class. 
Table 1 Impact of the proposed features on the performance 
of the classification system. 
Performance in 
Features Climb Cut Stick drag Stone throwing
TLC, d, slope, ө 87 % 100 % 95 % 100 % 
TLC, d, slope, ө, NZ 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
 
3.2 Mitigation of continuous-nuisance alarm 
based on LCs 
Suppression of continuous nuisance alarms such 
as those induced by torrential rain is one of the most 
challenging tasks for outdoor perimeter intrusion 
detection systems (PIDS). A real-time level 
crossings algorithm to mitigate rain-induced 
nuisance alarms in fence based fiber-optic intrusion 
detection systems was proposed and implemented 
[13]. This algorithm is computationally 
non-intensive, and it can be used to eliminate 
rain-induced nuisance alarms for torrential rainfall 
rates up to and in excess of 100 mm/hr. The LCs 
based algorithm is also used to discriminate between 
continuous nuisances such as rain and 
non-continuous intrusion events, which allows for 
simultaneous detection of intrusion events. The 
algorithm also employs a dynamic event threshold to 
be able to automatically adjust to varying rainfall 
rates. 
The LC algorithm was integrated into the locator 
sensing controller which was installed in numerous 
sites worldwide that experienced torrential rainfall. 
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These sites experienced rainfall rates up to and in 
excess of 100 mm/hour (> 4 inches/hr). Results from 
these sites have demonstrated the elimination of 
rain-induced nuisance alarms with the simultaneous 
detection of intrusion events. The LC-based 
algorithm is used to discriminate between 
continuous nuisances such as rain and 
non-continuous intrusion events. Due to its 
continuous nature, torrential rainfall will generate a 
fairly consistent level-crossing rate per time block 
period. This feature can be used to suppress rainfall 
induced alarms from the system. By monitoring for 
any changes in the level crossing rate, 
non-continuous intrusion events such as fence 
climbing or cutting can be detected during the 
rainfall period. Using a dynamic intrusion event 
threshold has also proven to be effective in 
automatically adjusting to variable rainfall rates. 
Figure 10 shows an example of the detected 
torrential rain signal on a 3.2-km long chain link 
fence perimeter. The LC representation (see inset 
nuisance level graph in Fig. 10) can be used to detect 
intrusions whose signals are essentially buried inside 
the time domain representation of the rain signal. 
The LC algorithm can also be adapted to deal with 
other continuous or semi-continuous nuisances such 
as nearby traffic noise in a similar way. 
 
Fig. 10 Real-time elimination of rain-induced nuisance 
alarms with simultaneous intrusion detection on a 3.2-km chain 
link fence (the inset graph is the LC representation of nuisance 
and intrusion events). 
4. Intrusion detection and nuisance 
suppression in buried systems 
Buried-fiber-optic sensors, such as those 
implemented for protecting buried oil and gas 
pipelines, are designed to detect physical 
disturbances generated by TPI which includes 
accidental or deliberate digging or excavation 
activities. These systems are also susceptible to a 
range of ground based nuisance events such as road 
and railway traffic and other nearby construction 
activities. These events can reduce an intrusion 
detection system’s effectiveness with an unacceptably 
high rate of nuisance alarms. In this section, some 
novel signal processing techniques are outlined to 
mitigate the effect of these nuisance events on 
buried intrusion detection systems by suppressing 
particular nuisance induced alarms without affecting 
alarms generated by intrusion events of interest. 
Figures 11(a) and 11(b) show detected signal 
examples of typical intrusion events that should be 
detected, while Figs. 12(a) and 12(b) show typical 
signals of nuisance alarms due to traffic that should 
be rejected on a 2.7-km buried gas pipeline. 
 








































Fig. 11 Time domain representation of intrusion events:    
(a) the intrusion signal caused by digging with a pick-axe above 
a 2.7-km buried gas pipeline protected by a locator system and 
(b) intrusion signal caused by digging with a back-hoe above a 
2.7-km buried gas pipeline protected by a locator system. 
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Fig. 12 Time domain representation of nuisance events:    
(a) the nuisance signal from traffic on a nearby road for a 
2.7-km gas pipeline intrusion detection system and (b) strong 
periodic nuisance signal from a railway crossing for a 2.7-km 
gas pipeline intrusion detection system (the railway runs 
perpendicularly over the pipeline). 
4.1 Pre-processing and feature extraction 
The novel nuisance alarm suppression algorithm 
described herein consists of event detection, signal 
feature extraction from the time domain 
representation of the signals, and a simple decision 
tree classifier. Event detection is based on the 
previously mentioned LCs algorithm. Figure 13 
shows the pre-processing and feature extraction 
stages of the nuisance suppression algorithm. 
A number of extracted features have been 
identified as shown in Fig. 13. Three of these 
features were used for nuisance alarm suppression. 
These features are described below: 
1. Continuity of the signal: this is a measure of 
how continuous the signal is over its duration. It is 
determined by using the maximum amplitude versus 
segment information, Vm(k) where k =1, 2, ..., K, and 
K is the total number of segments within the detected 
event (see the pre-processing stage in Fig. 13). The 
continuity, C , can be given by 
GC
K
                 (3) 
where G is the number of segments in the vector 
Vm(k) with the value more than thresh2 and the 
parameter thresh2 is normally set above the system 
noise of the time domain signal as in the case of LCs. 
The maximum possible continuity is unity. 
2. Maximum amplitude strength (MAS) (count %): 
to evaluate the MAS feature, first the amplitude 
strength of each segment (ASES) needs to be 
measured. The amplitude strength relates to how 
much of a signal is above a given amplitude 
threshold thresh1 and is defined by (4). The 
parameter thresh1 is normally application dependent. 
After evaluating the amplitude strength using (4), 
the MAS feature is calculated as the maximum value 
calculated by (4) over the whole duration of the 
detected event (see Fig. 13). It is effectively a 
measure of what percentage of a signal is above a 
given threshold value and is given as a percentage 
value. This feature is important for distinguishing 
digging events from traffic nuisances that have 
similar continuity values. The intrusion signals will 




                (4) 
where S is the number of samples in the specified 
segment (>thresh1), and Stotal is the total number of 
samples in the specified segment. 
3. Maximum deviation (MD, σm): the first step 
towards the evaluation of the MD is by the 
evaluation of the maximum amplitude in each 
segment, Vm(k), as is the case for the continuity 
feature (see Fig. 13). The MD is then calculated by 
subtracting the mean of the vector Vm(k) from the 
maximum value in the vector Vm(k): 
     max meanm m mV k V k          (5) 
where Vm(k) is a vector containing the maximum 
amplitude in each segment and k =1, 2, ..., K. This 
feature is important for discriminating between 
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digging intrusion events and adjacent nuisance 
events of comparably long continuities, even if they 
have roughly similar amplitudes. In this situation, 
the digging events will have a higher maximum 
deviation owing to their higher variation in segment 
maxima. This can be seen by comparing the two 
signals represented by Figs. 11(b) (intrusion) and 
12(b) (adjacent nuisance) where there are more 
periods of inactivity in the digging signal (lower in 
the amplitude) when compared with the continuous 
nuisance signal. This translates into a higher 
maximum deviation for the digging signal. 
 Detected event 
Evaluate total LCsSignal rectification/10 equal segments 
Measure max peak in each segment Measure% of the samples in eachsegment above specified  
threshold 
Maximum deviation Continuity 
Extracted features 





Fig. 13 New alarming system feature extraction method. 
4.2 Classification using simple decision tree 
By using the features described in the previous 
section in the right combination, it is possible to 
suppress a large number of nuisance alarms in 
buried intrusion detection systems. This can be done 
by implementing a decision tree. Decision trees 
represent a series of IF…THEN type rules which are 
linked together and can be used to classify or predict 
events based upon the values of a select number of 
features. For this work, we use a simple decision 
tree to discriminate between intrusion and nuisance 
events. Neural networks can also be used with these 
features to discriminate between true alarms and 
nuisance events. Intrusion events will generate 
alarms while nuisance events will be ignored. 
Real captured intrusion and nuisance event 
signals from two sites are used to test the proposed 
algorithm. Table 2 shows the values of the features 
for the intrusion and nuisance events in Figs. 11 and 
12, respectively. The real intrusion and nuisance 
data are used to derive appropriate threshold values, 
thresh_1, thresh_2, thresh_3, and thresh_4 for the 
decision tree as shown in Fig. 14. In this example, 
thresh_1 = [0, 0.8) and [0.8, 1], thresh_2 = [0, 10) 
and [10, 100], thresh_3 = [0, 15) and [15, 100] and 
thresh_4 = [0, 0.9) and [0.9, 5]. Using these values 
the algorithm classifies digging events accurately 
(Figs. 11(a) and 11(b)) while traffic nuisances [such 





































Fig. 14 Practical example of the decision tree. 










Intrusion [hand and assisted 
digging, Fig. 11(b)] 
0.4 34.86 3.595 Node-2
Vehicular traffic [adjacent 
traffic, Fig. 12(a)] 
1 1.86 0.76 Node-3
Road intersection and train 
crossings [Fig. 12(b)] 
1 18.99 0.4712 Node-4
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The performance criteria of real-time fiber optic 
perimeter intrusion detection systems have been 
discussed. Performance results have shown that the 
quality of sensor installation and fence construction 
needs to be controlled to reduce excessive nuisance 
signals. More importantly, an effective robust event 
classification system also needs to be implemented 
to minimize nuisance alarms while maintaining a 
high probability of detection to intrusion events. 
A number of signal processing techniques for 
intrusion event detection and classification, and 
nuisance alarm suppression in a fiber-optic intrusion 
detection system have been proposed and presented. 
In fence-based systems, intrusion and non-intrusion 
events such as fence climbing, fence cutting, 
stick-dragging, and stone-throwing have been 
successfully classified in real time and demonstrated 
on a standard chain link fence using robust level 
crossings based features and artificial neural 
networks. Additionally, the use of a level crossings 
based algorithm with a dynamic threshold for 
suppressing torrential rain-induced nuisance alarms 
in fence-based fiber-optic perimeter intrusion 
detection systems has demonstrated its effectiveness 
against torrential rainfall rates in excess of 100 mm/hr. 
The simultaneous detection of intrusion events 
during rainfall periods has also been demonstrated. 
In buried fiber-optic pipeline intrusion detection 
systems, a level crossings based detection and novel 
classification algorithm have also been implemented. 
The use of a decision tree classification algorithm 
has demonstrated the effective classification of both 
traffic induced nuisance events and digging and 
excavation intrusion events. 
Future work is focusing on increasing the library 
of signal features to achieve the classification of 
more intrusion and nuisance events in a wider range 
of operating environments. 
 
Open Access: This article is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License which 
permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any 





[1] A. D. Kersey, “A review of recent developments in 
fiber optic sensor technology,” Optical Fiber 
Technology, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 291–317, 1996. 
[2] J. Katsifolis and L. McIntosh, “Apparatus and method 
for using a counter-propagating signal method for 
locating events,” U.S. Patent 7,499,177, 2009. 
[3] J. C. Juarez, E. W. Maier, K. N. Choi, and H. F. Taylor, 
“Distributed fiber-optic intrusion sensor system,” 
Journal of Lightwave Technology, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 
2081–2087, 2005. 
[4] J. C. Juarez and H. F. Taylor, “Field test of a 
distributed fiber-optic intrusion sensor system for 
long perimeters,” Applied Optics, vol. 46, no. 11, pp. 
1968–1971, 2007. 
[5] S. Tarr and G. Leach, “The dependence of detection 
system performance on fence construction and 
detector location,” in Proceedings of the 32nd Annual 
IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security 
Technology, pp. 196–200, 1998. 
[6] L. H. Jiang, X. M. Liu, and F. Zhang, “Multi-target 
recognition used in airpoty fiber fence warning 
system,” in Proceedings of the Ninth International 
Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics, 
Qingdao, Jul. 11–14, pp. 1126–1129, 2010. 
[7] J. D. Vries, “A low cost fence impact classification 
system with neural networks,” in Proceedings of 7th 
AFRICON Conference in Africa, Sept. 15–17, vol. 1, 
pp. 131–136, 2004. 
[8] A. Yousefi, A. A. Dibazar, and T. Berger, “Intelligent 
fence intrusion detection system: detection of 
intentional fence breaching and recognition of fence 
climbing,” in IEEE International Conference on 
Technologies for Homeland Security, Boston, May 
12–13, pp. 620–625, 2008. 
[9] H. Min, C. Lee, J. Lee, and C. H. Park, “Abnormal 
signal detection in gas pipes using neural networks,” 
in Proceeding of 33rd Annual Conference of the IEEE 




                                                                                             Photonic Sensors 
 
236 
[10] S. Mahmoud and J. Katsifolis, “Robust event 
classification for a fiber optic perimeter intrusion 
detection system using level crossing features and 
artificial neural networks,” in Proc. SPIE, vol. 7677, 
pp. 767708, 2010. 
[11] L. R. Rabiner and R. W. Schafer, Digital Processing 
of Speech Signals. London: Pearson Education, 
1978. 
[12] J. C. Junqua, B. Mak, and B. Reaves, “A robust 
algorithm for word boundary detection in the 
presence of noise,” IEEE Transactions on Speech 
and Audio Processing, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 407–412, 
1994. 
[13] S. Mahmoud and J. Katsifolis, “Elimination of 
rain-induced nuisance alarms in distributed 
fiber-optic perimeter intrusion detection systems,” in 
Proc. SPIE, vol. 7316, pp. 731604-1–731604-11, 
2009. 
[14] A. Freeman and M. Skapura, Neural Networkss: 
Algorithms, Applications, and Programming 
Techniques. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1991. 
[15] A. K. Jain, J. Mao, and K. M. Mohiuddin, “Artificial 
neural networks: a tutorial,” Computer, vol. 29, no. 3, 
pp. 31–44, 1996. 
 
